9   *ibid*, pp. 586, 589.

10   Todd, *The Story of the Exposition,* Vol. 3, p. 289.

11   *Orlando Sentinel,* 19 December 1993.

12   *Shenzhen: Splendid China, Miniature Scenic Spot,* p. 106. I am grateful to Ann Anagnost for lending me her copy of the guidebook.

13   *ibid,* p. 108.

14   *ibid,* p. 109-112.

15   *ibid,* p. 114.

16   See Edward Friedman, "A failed Chinese modernity", *Daedalus,* 122:2, Spring 1993, p. 2.

17   Arthur Waldron, *The Great Wall of China: From History to Myth,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 220; guidebook, p. 11. This view of the Great Wall is not unchallenged. You will be familiar with the controversy over the documentary "River Elegy", whose sombre narration mourns precisely the China "Splendid China" celebrates. To its authors the Great Wall was not a symbol of China's splendours but rather a "monument to tragedy", representing not strength but "impotent defence and timidity in the face of invasion". Its legacy is "self-deception [imprinted] on the very soul of China". Translated by Geremie Barme and Linda Jaivin in *New Ghosts, Old Dreams,* New York: Times Books, 1992, p. 151. At the same time, public response to Deng Xiaoping's patriotic campaign ("Let us love our country and restore our Great Wall") seems to have been greeted with considerable popular enthusiasm. Waldron, pp. 1, 225.

18   Lincoln Kaye, "Quality control", in *Far Eastern Economic Review,* 13 January 1994, p. 22.

19   Friedman, "Failed modernity", p. 2.

20   Report by Chen Huxiong, based on dispatches from *China News Digest,* Reuters and AP, 28 February 1994.

21   AP dispatch of 7 January 1994, quoted in *China News Digest,* 4 February 1994.

22   Catherine Samson, *Wall Street Journal,* 2 January, 1994, quoted in *China News Digest,* 4 February 1994.

23   Kathy Wilhelm, AP, 19 December 1993, quoted in *China News Digest,* 21 December 1993.

24   Not just Christmas, but Valentine's Day and April Fool's Day as well. The purpose of the ban is to "achieve a relatively stable cultural tradition on college campuses and promote our country's fine national culture", *China News Digest,* 9 December 1993.

25   Matei Mihalca, "The Pied Piper of Peking", in *Far Eastern Economic Review,* 30 September, 1993, p. 55.

26   See Anagnost, "The nationscape", *Positions,* 1:3, p. 601.

27   Report on Segal study by Ming Zhang and Chuck Lin, *China News Digest,* 15 March, 1994.

28   Rone Tempest, *China News Digest,* 23 February 1994.

Cultural nationalism in contemporary Japan:
The role of the state and the role of the market

Kosaku Yoshino

It was in the early 1980s that I began my study of cultural nationalism. At that time, very few people were studying this subject or even using the term cultural nationalism.[1] The increase in the literature on this topic over the past few years shows something of the increasing recognition of the importance of culture in what was once regarded as the realm of the political state. One of the points raised in my book, *Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan*, published in 1992, is the importance of the hitherto neglected perspective of the "market" in the study of nationalism. Whilst it is certainly important to examine how the state "produces" and disseminates national myth and ideology, as previous studies have done, it is equally essential to draw attention to the market process whereby nationalism is "reproduced" and "consumed" irrespective of the intention of the state. In this paper I wish to show, with reference to the contemporary Japanese case, the importance of the perspective of the "market" in the development of cultural nationalism.

Some key terms should first be defined. By nationalism I mean both the sentiment among a people that they constitute a community with distinctive characteristics, and the project of maintaining and enhancing that distinctiveness within an autonomous state. Whereas political nationalism emphasizes the nation's collective experience as a political reality by achieving a representative state for its community, cultural nationalism serves to regenerate the national community by creating, preserving or strengthening a people's cultural identity when it is felt to be lacking or threatened. In short, cultural nationalism is concerned with the distinctiveness of the nation as a cultural and historical community. Another distinction that I wish to propose is the one between what I call "primary" and "secondary" nationalism. By primary nationalism I mean original nationalism, concerned with inventing national identity, in contrast to

secondary nationalism which preserves, recreates and enhances national identity in an already established nation.[2] Boundaries between the two cannot be drawn with any precision, except possibly in the case of Japan, whose defeat of Japan marks the end of one kind of nationalism and the start of another. As Maruyama Masao (1969: 137) put it, Japan "completed one full circle of nationalism: birth, maturity and decline" in 1945.

The state and nationalism

Primary nationalism, or the initial phase of nationalism, is usually the realm of myth-makers who formulate the ideology of the nation's identity by articulating its ancestral myth. In nationalist thinking, invention of a nation's ancestral "history" and tradition enables its members to share a sense of communal uniqueness and historical continuity. Such a historicist vision is usually taught "from above" to the masses through the medium of state-controlled education. The state injects its historicist views and inculcates national values through formal education. In Japan the invention of the tradition of the emperor system (tennōsei) in the late 1890s was intended to serve this purpose. The emperor system was created out of the combination of a familistic notion of the state and state Shinto. As an effective means of ideological manipulation, analogy was drawn between state and family and thus between loyalty to the emperor and filial piety. The state had firm control over education, the Ministry of Education compiling school textbooks from 1903 (see e.g. Tsurumi 1970: ch.3).

In the post-war period since 1945 nationalistic elements and ideas have been muted in Japanese society, especially those associated with the pre-1945 state. Reforms conducted under the occupation included separation of religion and state, adoption of a new constitution, change of the constitutional status of the emperor, a new education system, elimination of the feudalistic *ie* (household/family) system, land reform, and so on (see e.g. Morris 1960). Criticism of feudalistic social legacies and state-initiated nationalism came from among Japanese thinkers themselves. Particular caution has been exercised in the post-war era to prevent a revival of those symbols and practices reminiscent of pre-war and war-time ultra-nationalism, such as display of the Rising Sun flag and the singing of the *Kimigayo* anthem at school ceremonies, introduction of elements of national pride into school curricula and so on (Yoshino 1992: 32-36, 203-208).

What kind of nationalism could emerge in these circumstances? What realms of society and what social processes should one study to enquire into the nature of contemporary nationalism? At present it is questionable whether the state can effectively enhance national sentiment. This is because until recently restraints on explicit expression of state-initiated nationalism have been very strong among significant numbers of the general public in Japan. Furthermore, we should consider the point that, although some of the symbolic rituals of "old" nationalism may enhance national solidarity, nationalistic rituals also work in the opposite way. This point is underscored by Robert Bocock (1974: 98) when he remarks that rituals "may also make some groups feel less part of the national group in that they are made conscious of the fact that they do not share some of the values which seem to lie behind the group's ritual". Indeed, there have always been and still are significant numbers of people whose opposition to nationalistic values are reinforced precisely because of the existence of "nationalistic" rituals, such as the display of the "national" flag and the singing of the "national" anthem at school ceremonies, "National Foundation Day", Cabinet Ministers' visits to the Yasukuni Shrine (where war dead including war criminals are enshrined), and so on.[3] Such rituals are for them a continuous reminder of their opposition to nationalism.

State-initiated nationalism often fails to elicit voluntary and active support from large sections of the general public precisely because it bases itself upon obviously nationalistic symbols and ideas. Most Japanese still adhere to anti-war and anti-nationalist sentiments and reject personal sacrifice for the sake of the nationalistic agenda of the state. This suggests that strict adherence to the classic, state-oriented perspective on nationalism may result in failure to grasp some of the interesting issues of nationalism in contemporary society. Nationalism may arise in realms where the state is absent.

The *nihonjinron*: Discourse on cultural differences

Cultural nationalism, primary or secondary, often involves the process by which cultural and political élites formulate the discourse on national distinctiveness and by which other social groups respond to it. Let us now highlight the characteristic features of Japan's secondary nationalism as (opposed to its primary nationalism) with respect to the manners of production, distribution and consumption of the discourse on national identity.

In secondary nationalism a sense of belonging to a historical nation is already taken for granted. Thus ancestral myth or historicist vision becomes less relevant. Of course, history continues to be reinterpreted and represented but the nation's origin becomes less relevant as a source of national identity. Those who in the 1970s and 1980s formulated the discourse on the peculiarities or uniqueness of Japanese patterns of behaviour were, in a sense, "pop sociologists" or "pop anthropologists". The literature they produced is generally referred to as *nihonjinron* (discourse of the Japanese).

Thinking élites of diverse backgrounds, including not only academics, journalists and writers but also diplomats and the business élite, produced the vast amount of literature on Japanese distinctiveness during this period.

Since *nihonjinron* has already been discussed extensively in Japanese studies, it serves our purpose to provide a brief summary of its three main propositions (see e.g. Mouer and Sugimoto 1986; Befu 1987; Dale 1986). First, the patterns of communication of the Japanese are characterized in the *nihonjinron* by taciturnity, disregard for logic, emotionality and situational ethics. These contrast with Western patterns, which are characterized by eloquence, dichotomous logic, rigid principles and rationality. One popular theme in the *nihonjinron* is that essential communication is performed non-logically, non-verbally and empathetically. Because of the mutual sensitivity found in the social interaction of the Japanese, explicit verbal communication is not considered necessary (e.g. Matsumoto 1984).

Second, Japanese society is characterized by groupism or "interpersonalism", vertical stratification and dependence (other-directedness), as opposed to Western society which is characterized by individualism, horizontal (class-based) stratification and independence (self-autonomy) (Nakane 1967, 1970). This group-oriented tendency is usually derived from the child-rearing practices in Japan, where the attitude of dependence (*amae*) is encouraged and prolonged into adulthood (Doi 1971). Third, Japanese society is taken as uni-racial and homogeneous. Again, this is in contrast to Western society, which is defined as multi-racial and heterogeneous in its composition. The three themes are closely interrelated: the Japanese patterns of communication which discourage dichotomous logic and verbal confrontation are strongly related to the high value placed on consensus and harmony in interpersonal relations, while empathetic, affective and non-logical communication is taken to be the product of the homogeneous make-up of society.

The *nihonjinron* had already become a dominant perspective on Japanese society in the early 1980s. Criticism of the *nihonjinron* emerged in various forms around the same time. I became interested in examining the roles the *nihonjinron* have played in the development of cultural nationalism in contemporary Japan. One common critique of the *nihonjinron* then current was to identify such writings as a nationalist ideology that economic, political and cultural élites invented to foment nationalism among the Japanese by attributing Japan's economic success and apparent social stability to its unique cultural virtues (e.g. Crawcour 1980: 186; Mouer and Sugimoto 1980: 7).[4] This seems an understandable assertion as there is clearly some kind of relationship between the *nihonjinron* and nationalism. I argue, however, that the view that simplistically assumes ideological manipulation "from above" is unsound as a perspective on contemporary cultural nationalism of this type. In order to enquire into the workings of contemporary Japanese nationalism in relation to the *nihonjinron*, I shall

show in the remainder of this paper the relevance of analysis of a "market" process whereby the discourse on cultural differences is "distributed" and "consumed" in the popular marketplace of ideas.

Who consumed the *nihonjinron*, how, and with what in mind?[5] The *nihonjinron* found a market among ordinary Japanese - ordinary in the sense of not being professional thinkers. They found the "products" of the *nihonjinron* attractive and "consumed" them because they felt such products could help them in dealing with practical problems in their own immediate surroundings. The realm of contemporary social culture dealt with in the *nihonjinron* is already thoroughly familiar to ordinary people. The role of thinking élites here is to provide ordinary people with perspectives from which to think more systematically about their society and behaviour. In particular the *nihonjinron* provided people interested in or involved in cross-cultural contacts with supposedly useful ideas on cultural differences. Such a concern is especially relevant to those concerned with intercultural communication such as international businessmen, students, tourists, overseas volunteers, cross-cultural social workers and so on.

Reproducing discourse of cultural differences

What is of particular importance here is that, even though sizeable sections of the educated population were influenced by the *nihonjinron*, they were not necessarily exposed directly to academics' *nihonjinron* as such. For example, many have heard of theories such as Nakane Chie's (1967) vertical society theory and Doi Takeo's (1971) theory of *amae* (dependence), but have not actually read their books. Here we should take note of the role of intermediaries who stand between intellectuals and the masses and who transmit intellectuals' ideas to a wider audience. In the special edition of *Daedalus* (1972) on intellectuals and tradition, Edward Shils and S.N. Eisenstadt pointed out the important role of "reproductive intellectuals" and "secondary intellectuals", as they called this type of intellectual, respectively. Eisenstadt remarked that, although secondary intellectuals who serve as channels of institutionalization of traditions and cultural identity have an important place in society, few if any of this group had been studied. There has been little if any progress in this field since then. In a more recent analysis of the contemporary cultural situation, Bourdieu (1984: 370) drew attention to "new intellectuals" as a social category playing an increasingly crucial role in the cultural realm. They are the transmitters and intermediaries for the popularization of intellectuals' ideas in contemporary society.

"Cultural intermediaries" have had a crucial role in the dissemination of the *nihonjinron*: they have interpreted academics' theories of Japanese

society and culture and rephrased them to suit more practical concerns, or reproduced them in a form that can be consumed by "ordinary" people. In fact this has been an important channel through which academics' *nihonjinron* have been disseminated amongst a wider readership. Interestingly, the business élite constitutes one main group of cultural intermediaries in contemporary Japan partly because the company is regarded as the microcosm of Japanese society. In the minds of the majority of middle-class Japanese the mode of thinking and behaviour of ordinary white-collar "salarymen" is the most typical representation of "Japanese culture". Moreover, compared to other secondary intellectuals such as school teachers, who hardly attract attention abroad, the business élite are aware through their international contacts that they are the subject of conversation abroad and they generally know how to present themselves to the rest of the world.

Here attention should be paid to what may be called "cross-cultural manuals" as a means by which cultural intermediaries have been used in popularizing the discourse on cultural differences in contemporary Japan. By cross-cultural manuals we mean handbooks on Japanese culture, practical guidebooks on life in Japan, glossaries which deal in one way or another with the distinctiveness of Japanese society in the contexts of business and management practices, company employees' everyday lifestyle, "untranslatable" Japanese expressions and so forth. Various cross-cultural manuals are on sale in Japanese bookshops, in the sections for reference manuals are on sale in Japanese bookshops, in the sections for reference books or books on Japan. Major Japanese companies have published "cross-cultural manuals", thereby becoming important agents in disseminating the discourse on cultural differences. These manuals include *Japanese Business Glossary* by Mitsubishi Corporation (1983), *The Scrutable Japanese* by Taiyo Kobe Bank (now Sakura Bank) (1988), *Skills in Cross-Cultural Negotiation* by Nissho Iwai (1987), and *Toshiba's Practical Cross-Cultural Dialogs* (1985). Nippon Steel Corporation's *Nippon: The Land and its People* (1982) is a best-seller in the genre of cross-cultural manuals. Of course, cross-cultural manuals are not merely produced by companies. In fact, stimulated by company publications, major commercial publishers have also set their sights on the cross-cultural manual market.

The content of these cross-cultural manuals is popularized *nihonjinron* ; the aim is to provide consumers with insights into cultural differences that can be put to practical use. Most of these cross-cultural manuals are presented in a dual-language format, as it is thought that, in the "age of internationalization", in addition to the ability to speak English, knowledge of cultural differences is indispensable. For example, the then President of Taiyo Kobe Bank explains the aim of their handbook, which is to contribute to "the promotion of an understanding of Japan and the Japanese people at a time when comprehension is badly needed to ease mounting trade tensions

(and also to) help Japanese students who are destined to live in an era of internationalization, by providing hints as to how things Japanese may be expressed in good English" (1988: 4).

This point is well illustrated by the type of handbook which combines spoken English study and perspectives on cultural differences. Both of these are considered necessary tools by many educated Japanese for achievement of the desired status of a *kokusaijin* (international person). For instance, in the following excerpt from English study material published by Nippon Steel Human Resources Development Co., Ltd. (1987), we can see the three main propositions of the *nihonjinron*, discussed above, neatly summarized and presented in the form of English dialogues:

> Mr Jones [an American]: ...I don't think I could ever learn to make the subtle distinctions you need in Japanese.
>
> Mr Suzuki [a Japanese businessman]: It's so tied in with the whole culture. It's difficult to master for someone who grew up in another country. Also, most Japanese tend to avoid doing anything that sets them off from others. They worry about what others think and change their behaviour accordingly.
>
> Mr Jones: That's probably one of the reasons why people talk about Japanese groupism.
>
> Mr Suzuki: It's a factor. It's also why Japanese are poor at asserting themselves. We tend to speak and act only after considering the other person's feelings and point of view.
>
> Mr Jones: You can't say that for most Westerners. In America we try to teach our children to be independent, take individual responsibility, develop their imaginations and creativity, develop their personality... This starts from a very young age, from babyhood practically. We also try to train them to think logically, and learn how to express their thoughts and opinions.
>
> Mr Suzuki: Yes, I know... Foreigners often criticize us Japanese for not giving clear-cut "yes" or "no" answers. This is probably connected to our being basically a homogeneous society and our traditional tendency to try to avoid conflicts...

Cassette tapes and now even compact disks are also available for this material. Needless to say, handbooks, practice tapes and compact disks like these provide prepackaged ideas about Japanese society and ways of expressing them.

It is important to note that many of the cultural intermediaries who have published cross-cultural manuals should not be called nationalists. Rather they might best be described as well-intentioned "internationalists" whose aim was to facilitate communication between Japanese and non-Japanese and to help bring about the emergence of large numbers of internationally minded Japanese with knowledge about cultural differences and the ability to communicate well in intercultural settings. The main concern behind the publication of cross-cultural manuals is to remove what are regarded as cultural obstacles in communication between Japanese and

non-Japanese, as is illustrated typically by the remark of the General Manager of the Corporate Communications Office of Mitsubishi Corporation. He says that their handbook is intended to "help smooth the way for better international communication" (1983: 6). Such intentions explain why the *nihonjinron* (perspectives on cultural differences) are popularized in such a way as to provide practical hints for social interaction between the Japanese and non-Japanese. In a best-selling handbook entitled *Japan As It Is: A Bilingual Guide* (1990), the key propositions of the *nihonjinron* are summarized in a chapter entitled "Getting along with the Japanese". Here are a couple of paragraphs:

> The fact that Japan does have such a high-density homogeneous population governs many of the social customs and personal mannerisms and makes them different from the way people relate in more heterogeneous societies... Japanese society has developed numerous groups each with its own common consciousness and numerous tacit understandings that are reached or conveyed without a word being said...

> If the individual is the basic unit of Euro-American society, in Japan it is the group. This is not a society constituted by autonomous individuals but one made up of people who are constantly interacting with society and constantly aware of this interaction. If you ask a Japanese what he thinks, he is very likely to answer by asking what everybody else thinks (Gakken 1990: 63).

Ironically, however, the basic assumption held by Japanese, that intercultural communication is impeded by the unique peculiarities of Japanese patterns of behaviour and thought, has tended to produce the end result of cultural nationalism, not improved intercultural understanding. It would appear that excessive emphasis on Japanese difference has in fact had the unintended consequence of strengthening cultural nationalism, since such emphasis neglects those aspects of life held in common by different peoples. In short, what started as a well-intentioned activity to facilitate intercultural communication thus had the unintended and ironic consequence of sensitizing the Japanese excessively to their distinctiveness and thereby creating another obstacle to communication. The resultant assumption, that foreigners cannot understand Japanese people because of the latter's supposedly unique mode of thinking, actually raised a barrier to foreign residents' adaptation to social life in Japan. In this ironic sense an interest in intercultural communication and cultural nationalism are two sides of the same coin.

It may be argued that, whereas schools are the chief agency of ideological transmission in state-initiated primary nationalism, the "cross-cultural industry" like that illustrated above has become an important institution through which to reproduce the discourse on cultural differences in secondary cultural nationalism. It may also be argued that, whereas school textbooks are a means of childhood socialization, cross-cultural manuals are used for adult socialization to reconstruct and reinforce Japanese identity. Calling to mind Norbert Elias (1978, 1982) and his

original analysis of manuals and books of manners in *The Civilizing Process*, we may say that cross-cultural manuals are intended to be used in the "civilizing process" by which elites adopt correct manners and behaviour as "internationalized persons" in the increasingly globalizing world.

The state and the market

In this paper I have been primarily concerned with the process whereby the discourse on cultural differences is "reproduced" and "consumed" in the "market". I have argued that this perspective, hitherto neglected in studies of nationalism, is necessary for the analysis of contemporary Japan where people's participation in cultural nationalism is no longer explicitly supervized by the state. I am not suggesting, however, that the state no longer plays an important role in cultural nationalism. One should not totally neglect the role of the state. There is little question that the state is still a powerful agent of cultural nationalism in contemporary Japan. The state influences, and is influenced by, agencies of cultural production and reproduction (television, newspapers, advertizing agencies, etc). Moreover, formal education is a state enterprise. The state now *requires* the *Hinomaru* flag to be displayed and the *Kimigayo* anthem to be sung at school ceremonies as a way of restoring national pride that was long suppressed in the post-war period. The Ministry of Education also controls the content of the curriculum through the system of authorizing school textbooks. The state's interest in nationalism can be seen in its selection of historical figures in the primary school history curriculum, which includes 42 historical figures with the emphasis on national heroes such as Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō, whose exploits in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) were used to promote militarism in textbooks during the Second World War. (I should hasten to add that in 1995 the Ministry showed more flexibility than previously in screening school textbooks. Tōgō does not appear in the majority of textbooks, and much more space is now given to Japan's wartime aggression in Asia.)

Some critics also draw attention to he role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mouer and Sugimoto (1986: 177-181) argued that the Japanese state had for a long time taken an interest in promoting certain images of Japan. (It should be noted that foreigners' perceptions of "our" culture are closely associated with "our" discourse on "our" identity, as illustrated in the dialogue between Orientalism and counter-Orientalism.) The two critics take note of the fact that the Foreign Ministry translated a number of books on Japanese distinctiveness for distribution overseas. For example, the Foreign Ministry produced its own translation of Nakane's *Human Relations in Vertical Society* in 1972 and distributed thousands of copies in Europe and South-East Asia. Does this suggest that the state intentionally promotes a

particular type of discourse on Japanese distinctiveness? It is difficult to draw firm conclusions about something that happened over 20 years ago. Mouer and Sugimoto may be right in supposing that the Japanese state was interested in promoting the holistic and consensus image of Japanese society (as opposed to the conflict image), considering that the Foreign Ministry translated and distributed yet another volume, Yakabe's *Labor Relations in Japan* (1977), which discusses the secrets of industrial harmony in Japan more explicitly.

How then is one to explain the Foreign Ministry's distribution in recent years of a cross-cultural handbook, *Japan As It Is*, to European youth groups invited to Japan each year by the ministry for short-term study visits? This handbook, as mentioned earlier, contains a number of *nihonjinron* perspectives including some very controversial ones. One chapter, entitled "The Japanese Brain", introduces Tsunoda Tadanobu's socio-biological theory (1978) that the cultural uniqueness of the Japanese can be traced to the unique structure of their brain. Should this example be taken as suggesting that the Japanese state actively endorses and promotes nationalistic and racial ideas? In fact such a conclusion would be difficult to reach, considering how this handbook came to be chosen. A ministry official in charge of this programme remarked that they had come across this particular one while looking for handbooks useful for someone coming to Japan for the first time and staying there for a short while. It was, they found, both compact and comprehensive. Indeed, *Japan As It Is* is comprehensive in its treatment of subjects which cover nearly all main aspects of Japanese society, economy, polity, history, religion, life-style, art, literature and so on. We may say that, as a powerful state institution, the Foreign Ministry should be more careful in its selection, but one cannot put the ministry's choice down to narrow adherence to the classic view of the state's role in the discourse on culture. It seems too simplistic to suppose on the basis of this example that the state has a nationalistic agenda. The market perspective would prove more useful here. One could argue that in this instance the state is "just another" consumer and distributor of a cross-cultural manual in the cultural market.

As discussed earlier, the state also promotes its own version of cultural nationalism. An analytical distinction, however, should be made between the state-initiated process and the market-generated process. When the state imposes particular views on history and culture through the Education Ministry and other state agencies, it has its own agenda and is acting on its own initiatives. This does not mean however that every similar act by the state can be explained in terms of the state-initiated process. In the above example the state plays a part in disseminating the *nihonjinron* discourse, but should be seen as simply acting within the framework of the market. The two processes (i.e. the state-initiated process and the market-generated process) should be clearly distinguished in order to understand the nature of

cultural nationalism in contemporary Japan. Simplistic focus on the role of the state would result in failure to recognize a number of relevant issues in contemporary nationalism.

Our argument in this paper has pointed to the informal process whereby nationalism is generated in the market place. Bauman (1992: 17) makes a relevant point:

> As the interest of the state in culture faded (i.e. the relevance of culture to the reproduction of political power diminished), culture was coming within the orbit of another power the intellectuals could not measure up to - the market... More and more the culture of consumer society was subordinated to the function of producing and reproducing skilful and eager consumers rather than obedient and willing subjects of the state...

Previous studies of nationalism merely looked at the ways in which élites produce nationalist myth and ideology and disseminate them throughout the population. I have criticized this "statist" and "productivist" bias and attempted to introduce a "market" perspective. Who consumes nationalism, why and how? What are the social uses of nationalism? The classic analysis of cultural nationalism has tended to be confined to the political process of ideological manipulation and mobilization. Broadening the scope of enquiry, our Japanese case throws light upon ways in which cultural nationalism can be generated without explicit or intended ideological manipulation. Having recognized the importance of the "market" in present-day cultural nationalism, it is incumbent upon us to enquire into the relationship between it and the roles (past and present) of the state, but this topic is too big to be covered here and requires separate treatment elsewhere.

Notes

[1]   A few exceptions include Hutchinson (1987) and Robinson (1988).

[2]   For more discussion of primary and secondary nationalism see Yoshino (1992).

[3]   At its annual convention in September 1995 the Japan Teachers' Union officially abandoned its decades-old opposition to the state-led promotion of the use of the Rising Sun flag and the *Kimigayo* anthem, symbols associated with pre-war nationalism. The union also accepted some of the Education Ministry's course guidelines and stated that it would agree to give up its confrontational attitude towards the ministry. The union's new policy of compromise with the Education Ministry met with strong opposition from many members at the convention until it was finally approved.

[4]   The "economic success" perspective probably applies to some members of the business, political and cultural élites, but questions have to be raised as to its validity as a way of thinking of the more "ordinary" members of society; see Yoshino 1992: 188-191.

[5]   In order to enquire into this question, I conducted field research from October 1986 to September 1988 in a fairly large provincial city of several hundred thousand inhabitants in central Japan, in addition to frequent visits to and extended stays in this city

before and after this period. (For the methods and findings of this research see Yoshino 1992: chs 6-10).

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